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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN H. WHITEHOUSE, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
-v-
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief of 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20669 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
Many facts have been stipulated to as mentioned in 
appellant's brief. However, in order to draw a more complete 
refusal picture the following is presented to the court. 
The discussion is taken from excerpts of the transcript 
of the trial courts proceedings and reads: 
A. DUI, driving under the influence. 
Q. And subsequent to that arrest, did you ask him to 
take a breathylizer examination to determine the alcohol content 
in his blood? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. As we were pulling away in the 
car on the way to the South Salt Lake where the intoxilator is 
located, I said, "I am going to request you take a breathylizer 
test." He replied, "I know. I have been through it before." 
Q. Is that a direct quote? 
A. It's as close as I can come this far down the road. 
(T-6)• 
Q. But you could remember it or not? 
A* Yesf sir, that was the gist of his comment. 
Q. Then what was said between you and he? 
A. Then I said, "Then you know if you refuse to take 
the test, you may lose your license for one year?" that he had 
actually heard my comment about the refusal. (T-6). 
Q. After this did you again ask him to take the test 
and did he agree? 
A. I asked him to take the test, yesr sirf and he 
agreed. 
Q. So was the test administered? 
A* No., sir, it was not. (T-7). 
Q. Did you ask another to administer the test? 
A. Yes, sir. Sgt. Gillette. 
Q. And you took him to the South Salt Lake 
breathylizer room; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir, it's the squad room. 
Q. And then what happened or transpired in an attempt 
to obtain that test? 
A. Sgt. Gillette came in approximately three or four 
minutes after Mr. Whitehouse and I arrived at the office. Sgt. 
Gillette began to warm up the intoxilizer and prepared the 
intoxilizer for the test. During that time I went into the 
locker room and brought my tape recorder in and began to tape the 
conversation. 
-2-
Mr. Whitehouse, for the next approximately two or three 
minutes, waxed eloquently about his situation and various things 
he thought wrong with the state and other matters. And during 
that time I was questioning him as to his phone number, all the 
pertinent data that you found here on the DUI report form at the 
top of the page, his address and so on and so forth. 
Q. Was he able to give you that? 
A. Yes, sir, he was. 
Q. And were those responses to your questions 
voluntary? 
A. Yes, s i r , they were. 
Q. Did — now, you said the test was not administered? 
A. No, sir, it was not. 
Q. Would you tell us who was present and what 
transpired? 
A. Sgt. Gillette, after he had prepared the machine 
and the punch card, asked Mr. Whitehouse if he was going to take 
the test, and he replied — may I refer to the form? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Agent G i l l e t t e said, "Do you wish to take the 
t e s t ? " And Mr. Whitehouse said, "No, I don ' t . "* And then Sgt. 
G i l l e t t e sa id , "You don ' t want to take i t ? " And Mr. Whitehouse 
answers, "No." (T7-9). 
Q. Officer, did Mr. Whitehouse say or do anything at 
tha t time to indicate tha t he understood tha t if he did not take 
tha t t e s t he could lose h i s d r i v e r ' s l icense for a year? (T-9-
10) . 
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A. He stated, "I have been without a license for four 
years. I might as well go another year without it." 
Q. And he used the words "another year without it"? 
(T-10) 
A. May I refer to the transcript? 
Q. Wellr that's a direct quote. Go ahead and refer to 
it. 
A. The t r a n s c r i p t reads f "Chris t , I have went four and 
a half years without a d r i v e r ' s l i c ense . Why not go another 
year?" (T-10). 
Q. And do you remember him saying tha t? 
A. Yes, s i r . 
Q. In your presence and the presence of Officer 
G i l l e t t e ? 
A. Yes, s i r . 
Q. Then what did Officer G i l l e t t e say? ( T - l l ) . 
A. "In other words, you ' re saying you ' re not going to 
take the t e s t or you ' re going to take the t e s t ; which? 
Q. What was the response? 
A. "No, I am not ." 
Q. Do you know if Mr. Whitehouse knew whether or not 
he was being — the conversation was being taped? 
A. Yes, s i r , he knew i t was being taped. 
Q. In f ac t , he said on there words to the ef fec t , "To 
be honest with you, and I w i l l put t h i s on the recording," t h a t 
he d i d n ' t want to take the t e s t ? 
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A. Yes, sir, I believe he used the term "on the 
record," or "on record." 
Q. Then what happened next after he said he would not 
take the test? (T-ll-12). 
A. Then I believe Sgt. Gillette asked him again, 
"You're not going to take the test?" And he said, "No, I am 
not." And Sgt. Gillette made some comment about, "Thanks for 
wasting my time," and shut the machine down and left the office. 
Q. Now, Officer, did Mr* Whitehouse ever make any 
further request that the test be readministered to him? 
A. Yes, sir, he did. 
Q. Could you tell us the time element there and who 
was present and what was said? 
A. The only two present were myself and Mr. 
Whitehouse. It was approximately three to five minutes after 
Sgt. Gillette left that Mr. Whitehouse expressed his desire to 
take the test. I refused to allow him and I believe I explained 
that that would involve Sgt. Gillette coming back and turning on 
the machine and going through the same processes again. And that 
he had refused once, and I believe statutorily that was 
mentioned. (T-12). 
Appellant had approximately one hour and ten minutes 
after the stop to make the final refusal decision. (T-16-17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The police officer's decision to deny the appellant's 
request to take the breath test, after his prior refusal was 
reasonable in light of U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2). The statute 
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clearly provides that any recantation to a prior refusal must be 
done "immediately" thereafter. Although the appellant may have 
agreed to take the test approximately five minutes after his 
emphatic and clearly understanding refusal. The experienced 
driver had at least one and one-half hours to make an informed 
decision. Furthermore, the appellant was fully aware of his 
rights under Implied Consent due to past experience and was 
obviously being recalcitrant towards his clear statutory duty. 
In light of the statutory language embodied in the 
statute and the appellants defiant refusal statements described 
herein, the Lower Courts1 decision should be upheld by this 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT LAW, THE 
DRIVER HAS NO RIGHT TO REFUSE TO 
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST, AND CAN 
ONLY RECANT SUCH REFUSAL IF HE DOES 
SO IMMEDIATELY. 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10(2) as specifically 
amended in 1977 reads as follows: 
(2) "If the person has been placed 
under arrest and has thereafter been 
requested by a peace officer to submit 
• to any one or more of the chemical tests 
provided for in subsection (1) of this 
section and refuses to submit to the 
chemical test or tests, the person shall 
be warned by a peace officer requesting 
the test or tests that a refusal to submit 
to the test or test can result in revocation 
of his license to operate a motor vehicle. 
Following this warning, unless the person 
immediately requests the chemical test or 
tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered, no test shall be given* »»,f 
(emphasis added) 
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Appellant argues that a proper interpretation of this 
section would permit an arrestee driver to continuously recant 
his earlier refusal to submit to a chemical test for at least two 
hours. He urges that a prior refusal can be withdrawn if done 
"within a reasonable time after his arrest and without evidence 
of undue delay effecting the validity of the test results or 
hardships on the police." 
This interpretation is in direct opposition to the 
obvious meaning of the statute and its intended purpose. The 
police would have to prove a hardship (or a lack of by the 
driver) and the unclear issues of "undue delay," the refused 
tests1 possible "validity and reasonableness" of times would all 
then become issues clouding the clear statutory skies and 
increasing the desire for litigation de novo. 
In the pre-Utah amendment case of Campbell v. Superior 
£aiir£f (1971) 479 P.2d 685, 692 f the Arizona Supreme Court said 
the following concerning their nearly identical statute: 
In Arizona, A.R.A.f § 28-691, sub-sec. 
D provides that "[I]f a person under 
arrest refuses to submit to a chemical 
test designated by the law enforcement 
agency as provided in subsection A, 
none shall be given." This language 
does not give a person a "right" to 
refuse to submit to the test only the 
physical power." 
The Utah Statute also says: "any person operating a 
motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his 
consent, "at the direction of the peace officer."... who shall 
determine which test "shall be administered." U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 
subsection (1). 
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It is clear, that a person does not have the "right" to 
refuse the chemical test but the question remains as to how much 
time must the arrestee be allowed in which to recant agree and 
submit to the test? In Utah, subsection (2) is clear on this 
issue where it states that: 
"Following this warning, unless the 
person immediately requests the 
chemical test... none shall be 
given." Id. subsection (2) (emphasis added) 
The apparent meaning of the statute is that a person 
can refuse to submit to the chemical tests thereby avoiding 
contention but if he changes his mind, he must, immediately after 
his refusal, request to take the test, thereby avoiding delay and 
saving peace officers time. All that is now required is a simple 
"yes or no." Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (1979). 
Appellant cites other states which support his minority 
proposition that delay is O.K. if not substantial. 
However, the statute was changed in 1977 to avoid delay and 
confusion under prior cases under prior law. There is therefore 
no need to adopt the reasoning or values of another state. 
In the case of Holman v. Cox. (Utah) 598 P.2d 1331, the 
court said: 
"While ar res ted driver has the r igh t 
t o refuse to give statements to a 
police off icer , he does not have 
the r ight to refuse to take a blood 
t e s t . Cf. Schmerber v. Cal i forn ia . 
384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 
908 (1966). The motoris t must choose 
between permitt ing the administrat ion 
of a blood alcohol t e s t and refusing 
the t e s t and running the r isk t h a t he 
wi l l lose his d r i v e r ' s l i cense for a 
period of t ime." (emphasis added) 
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The defendant argued that he was confused as to what 
rights he had under the circumstances and refused to take the 
chemical test for that reason. 
The court went further to provide an objective test by 
which the police officers and Courts could interpret the 
defendants response as a refusal by saying: 
Obviously the arresting officer cannot 
know the subjective state of mind of 
the person arrested and whether he 
in fact intended his response to a 
request to take a blood test to be 
equivalent of a refusal that would 
result in license revocation. The 
test must be objective: otherwise 
the whole statutory scheme could be 
subverted by one who equivocates or 
remains silent, and later protests 
that it was his unexpressed intent 
to take the test. However, the 
behavior of the driver must clearly 
indicate, judged objectively, that 
the driver intended to refuse to 
take the test. Id. p. 1333. (emphasis 
added) 
See Beck v. Cox, Utah 5097 P.2d 1335 (1979), and 
Strand v. State Department of Motor Vehicles,8 wash. App. 877, 
509 P.2d 999 (1973) for further authority. 
In Beck v. Cox, Id. p. 1338, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "a licensee did not have the right to reasonably refuse 
to submit to a chemical test." The court then expounded on the 
word "refusal" and asking "what constitutes a refusal" cited 
Spradling v. Deimeke, Mo., 528 S.W.2d 759 (1975) as saying: 
There is no mysterious meaning to the 
word "refusal". In the context of 
the implied consent law, it simply 
means that an arrestee, after having 
been requested to take the breathalyzer 
test, declines to do so of his own 
volition. Whether the declination is 
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accomplished by verbally sayingf "I 
refuse,n or by remaining silent and 
just not breathing or blowing into 
the machine, or by vocalizing some 
sort of qualified or conditional 
consent or refusal, does not make any 
difference. The volitional failure 
to do what is necessary in order 
that the test can be performed is a 
refusal. (emphasis added) 
In another Utah case where the facts were very similar 
to those of the present case, the defendant was asked for a 
fourth and final time at the jail house, whether or not he would 
take the test. The defendant refused to reply and the officer 
filled out the refusal form. Beck v. Cox. (Utah) 597 P.2d 1335 
(1979). The period of time that passed while the defendant and 
officer were at the jail house was approximately 5 to 7 minutes. 
Id. at 1343. 
Therefore, the appellant only had that much time in 
which to decide, possibly combined with the travel time to the 
courthouse, for a total of approximately 30 or 40 minutes. This 
Court commented on this time period saying: 
"Clearly, the plaintiff had ample 
opportunity to learn the consequences 
of his refusals to take a test and 
sufficient time to fully deliberate 
and even to change his mind." Id. p. 1337. 
Furthermore, by the appellants own admission in the 
case at bar, he was fully aware of the process entailed when 
arrested for driving under the influence. When the officer 
indicated that a breathalyzer test would be requested, the 
appellant responded "I know, I have been through it before." (T-
22). In fact, the appellant had already been without a license 
for four years. Therefore, the appellant had approximately one 
hour and fifteen minutes in which to make a decision. (T-16-17). 
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Furthermore, the appellant was requested to take the 
test and refused very clearly with prior experience at least four 
times to which the final time he responded to the request, "No, I 
am not." This Court in Beck v. Cox, discussed the question of 
how an officer should deal with this situation most aptly in its 
dicta by saying: 
How many times should an officer ask 
a driver, who refuses to give an 
unequivocal answer, to take the test? 
Should he be required to persist 
and continue to repeat the request 
until such time as the driver believes 
that he has achieved a degree of 
sobriety sufficient to pass the test 
and is safe in giving a straight 
answer? The consequence of such a 
construction is to place a premium on 
uncooperativeness and obstruction 
that would likely inflame an already 
tense situation. Certainly the 
Legislature did not intend that law 
enforcement officers be placed in 
such an impossible situation or that 
the purpose of the law should be so 
easily evaded. Id. p. 1337 (emphasis added) 
Clearly the situation that the police were dealing with 
when they arrested the appellant was impossible. Mr. Whitehouse 
admitted he was well aware of the consequences and procedures of 
driving while intoxicated and to having been without a license 
for four years. So he agreed to the test, waited, refused, 
knowingly, more than once, and then waited until the machine wag 
shut down to change his mind again. We do not know how long this 
would have gone on. 
Such behavior should not be rewarded simply because 
his change in mind was for only five to seven minutes. The fact 
remains that he already previously knew the consequences and 
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chose to forestall. A reading of the transcribed tape provided 
by Officer Midgley indicates as much. (Admitted Exhibit #2) Mr. 
Whitehouse waxed eloquently on about the system and how he had 
merely been trapped by such. Stating that he would not drink if 
the alcohol were not presented to himf the petitioner importuned 
the officer to just take him home because he knew he would flunk 
the test. The petitioner, having admitted that he had been 
through these procedures several times before, and in fact had 
had his drivers license suspended for four years, reasoned 
nwhatfs another year" upon making his final refusal. Given these 
facts, it is obvious that Mr. Whitehouse was simply playing games 
with the officer. Apparently, being aware of his own level of 
intoxication, he knew that submitting to the test would provide 
clear evidence of such. He equivocated until the intoxilizer 
machine was fully shut down, watching the entire procedure and 
waiting until he knew that such was completed. It is not argued 
that a person who is confused should be given time to reconsider 
his decision after having been presented a better explanation of 
his rights. However, to allow someone, fully cognizant as well 
as practiced in his legal rights under Utahfs DUI laws to 
equivocate, waste time, and try the patience of law enforcement 
officers, is simply providing loopholes through which other 
violator's of the law can squeeze through, ultimately vitiating 
the value of our legal system to nothing. 
Where the appellant's refusal had no basis in confusion 
and he was given numerous opportunities to withdraw his refusal, 
which he objectively knowingly continued to refuse, he should be 
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denied his driving privileges in accordance with the Lower Courts 
order and the intention of immediacy in the statute as 
interpreted by this Court in Beck v. Cox and Cavaness v. Cox, 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 41-6-44.10(2) 
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO HAVE ITS 
OBVIOUS MEANING, WHERE NO EVIDENCE 
OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO THE CONTRARY 
HAS BEEN PRESENTED. 
Prior to the 1977 amendments this Court had ruled in 
Hunter v. Dorius. 458 P.2d 877 (1969) that the individual had 
seventeen minutes to two hours to consult with an attorney and 
decide whether or not to agree to take the test or not. This 
defense of reasonable refusal seemed to also be upheld in 1975 in 
Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (Utah November 25, 1975) 
referring to Hunter v. Dorius and deciding the case on its facts 
where the defendant said that he would take the blood test if his 
doctor was present howeverr he could not locate his doctor. Then 
in Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451, (Utah April 23, 1976) the Court 
said that there was no evidence of refusal and that a 
constructive refusal was insufficient. 
But, as this Court later pointed out in Cavaness v. 
£QX, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah July 9f 1979), the 1977 legislative 
amendments to the statute were made to "eliminate delays" and to 
preclude the defense of "reasonable refusal as was contemplated 
by said prior cases." The amendments that the Legislature made 
were an attempt to eliminate all delays by inserting the word 
"immediate" and other statutory provisions such as crossing the 
word "reasonable" out of the words reasonable grounds and 
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providing for "actual physical control" and specifically 
providing that "no person shall have the right to select the test 
nor shall the officer's failure to provide for a specific test be 
a defense." In the interest of administrative efficiencyf the 
Legislature provided that "a peace officer" rather than an 
"arresting" officer should determine, crossing without the 
wording "within reason," which of the aforesaid tests shall be 
administered. The Legislature also inserted the provision that 
the failure or inability to obtain an additional test would not 
affect the admissibility or results of the tests taken, nnQL 
preclude or delay the test or tests to be takenr" and that such 
additional tests shall be "subsequent to" tests administered at 
the direction of the peace officer. 
Obviously intending promptness and efficiency, the 
Legislature also added the subsection providing that the driver 
could not consult with an attorney or physician as "a condition 
for the taking of any test." All of these amendments and more 
specifically inserting the wording " unless such person 
immediately requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a 
peace officer, no test shall be given." 
All of these amendments combined with the 1983 
statement of intent that the primary purpose of the provisions of 
this code "that relate to suspension or revocation of a persons 
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle... for refusing 
to take a chemical test provided for in U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10, is 
safely protecting persons on the roads and on the highways by 
quickly removing from those roads and highways persons who have 
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shown they are safety hazards... by refusing to take a chemical 
test that complies with the requirements of U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10," 
show a clear legislative intention towards immediacy and no 
delays, allowing the officer to get back on the road where he 
belongs. 
That intention was clearly discerned by this Court in 
Cavaness v. Coxr Id. p. 352, where again this Court said: 
"We therefore pass to the final point 
on appeal, that of a right to reasonably 
refuse to submit to a chemical test. 
Plaintiff cites certain Utah cases 
interpreting prior law as recognizing 
a reasonable refusal to submit to a 
chemical test. However, the statute 
has since been amended to expressly 
declare that for the purpose of 
determining whether to submit to a 
chemical test or test, the person to 
be tested shall not have the right 
to consult an attorney nor shall such 
person be permitted to have an 
attorney... present as a condition 
for the taking of any test. 
The foregoing amendment precludes 
the defense of reasonable refusal 
as was contemplated by said prior 
cases and now provides for a simple 
yes or no to the o f f i c e r ' s request , 
the obvious l e g i s l a t i v e purpose 
being to eliminate delays in the 
taking of the t e s t in l i g h t of the 
fact tha t alcohol quickly d i s s ipa t e s 
with the passage of t ime." (emphasis 
added) 
The essence of the present controversy i s founded on 
the issue of whether or not the purpose and wording of U.C.A. § 
41-6-44.10(2) would require a l i t e r a l de f in i t ion of the use of 
the word "immediately11 the re in . 
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Generally, the variance in possible interpretations of 
"immediately" is minimal at most. Definitions range from strict 
views requiring action to occur forthwith or "next"; to requiring 
action to occur within a reasonable amount of time, considering 
the pertinent circumstances. Some examples of such definitions 
follow: 
Immediately. Without interval of time, 
without delay, straightway, or without 
any delay or lapse of time. Drumbar v. 
Jeddo-Highland Coal Co», 155 Pa.Super. 
57, 37,1 A.2d 25, 27. The words 
"immediately and "forthwith" have 
generally the same meaning. They are 
stronger than the expression "within 
a reasonable time" and imply prompt 
vigorous action without any delay. 
Alsam Holding COt Vt Consolidated 
Taxpayers Mutt Ins. Co>r 4 N.Y.s.2d 
498, 505, 167 Misc. 732. Blacks Law 
Dictionary 675 (5th ed. 1969) 
immediate adj. 1. occurring without 
delay. 2. of or pertaining to the 
present time. 3. following without 
a lapse of time. 4. having no object 
or space intervening. 5. without 
intervening medium or agent. 
Random House Dictionary 443 (1980) 
"Immediately" means in direct connection 
or relation, in a way to concern or 
affect directly or closely; without 
intervention of any person or thing; 
proximately. Etter v. Blue Diamond 
Coal Co.. 215 S.W.2d 803, 806, 187 
Tenn. 407. (emphasis added) 
"Immediately" is not a word of precise 
signification and does not necessarily 
import the exclusion of all interval of 
time or space, but its meaning must be 
determined by the context in which it 
was used and the purpose for which 
the statute using the word was enacted. 
Umberger v, Koopr 72 s.E.2d 370, 375 
194 Va. 123. (emphasis added) 
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In reading the above definitions it is clear that the 
most widely accepted interpretation subscribes to the view that 
the act should follow directly from the cause and purpose of the 
statute. Apparently, the only time such a majority view is not 
followed is when such a disposition of the cause and effect are 
practically or realistically impossible. 
"It is a general rule of statutory construction that 
the words of a statute will be interpreted in their ordinary 
acceptation and significance, and the meaning commonly attributed 
to them. Jones v. Liberty Glass Co.. 332 U.S. 524, 92 L.Ed. 142, 
68 s.ct. 229; Rosennan v. United States, 323 u.s. 658, 89 L.Ed. 
535, 65 S.Ct. 536; Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 
1980). 
In the present case this rule should be followed. A 
common meaning that would be attributed to U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2) 
is that an arrestee would be required to recant his refusal 
moments after having made it. In Utah, our Supreme Court has 
made one exception to this rule, and that is in the case where an 
arrestee manifests confusion to the officer as to what his rights 
are. See Holman v. Cox. In the event that confusion is 
manifested, the officer has a duty to carefully explain the 
rights provided for the arrestee under Implied Consent Law. 
When there is apparent confusion 
arising from a failure of an arrestee 
to understand the demand for a blood 
test and the rights accorded under 
a Miranda warning, the officer must 
give a clear explanation of the duties 
and rights of the arrestee. An officer 
properly discharges his duty if he 
gives an explanation that a person 
of reasonable intelligence, who is 
-17-
in command of his sensesf would 
understand. Muir v. Cox, (Utah) 611 
P.2d 384, 386 (1980). 
Aside from this one exception, there is no reason why 
an arrestee should be able to equivocate on his duties to submit 
to a test. 
The Utah Supreme Court has required that an objective 
test be applied to the arrested person, stating: 
"The test must be objective; otherwise 
the whole statutory scheme could be 
subverted by one who equivocates or 
remains silent, and later protests 
that it was his unexpressed intent 
to take the tests. However, the 
behavior of the driver must clearly 
indicate, judged objectively, that 
the driver intended to refuse to take 
the test. See Holman v. Coy, 598 P.2d 
at 1333. (emphasis added) 
This same objection test was applied by the trial Court to the 
immediacy and sincerity of appellant's changes of mind. 
It is obvious that a literal meaning attributed to the 
statute, the word immediate, no defense, and officer shall 
determine in question could only serve the purposes of improving 
administrative efficiency by requiring a prompt yes or no, as 
well as making Utah highways a safer place to drive. An aphorism 
stated by the California Court in People v. Duroncekey, as far 
back as 1957, still cogently applies to us today noted that: 
"In a day when excessive loss of life 
and property is caused by inebriated 
drivers, an imperative need exists for 
a fair, efficient, and accurate system 
of detection, enforcement and, hence 
prevention." 48 Cal.2d 766, 772, 312 
P.2d 690 (1957). 
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There is no doubt, in light of the foregoing statement, 
that the problems the State of Utah is experiencing on its 
highways today are identical to those experienced in 1957. One 
way to implement a "fair and efficient" system which may militate 
against this problem is to interpret U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2), 
literally. 
There is a prima facie preference in 
favor of the literal meaning of the 
words of a statute, and the general 
rule requires an adherence to the 
letter thereof. The language of a 
statute is to be construed literally 
where there is no reason why it 
should not be so interpreted. Accordingly, 
any construction which contradicts 
the letter of a statute should be 
carefully scrutinized, and applied 
with caution and circumspection 
73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 208. 
A literal interpretation of the statute grants fairness 
to the inebriated arrestee where he is protected from having to 
act while confused as to his rights. Special duties are imposed 
(i.e. the officer has a duty to explain the Implied Consent Law) 
which act to protect those who are truly unable to discern the 
difference between their Miranda rights and their rights under 
the Implied Consent Law. However, for those who are objectively 
found to be simply recalcitrant, or who choose to stall from 
taking the test, a literal interpretation of the statute provides 
a viable remedy consistent with legislative intent. 
Appellant cites Lund v. Hjelle. 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 
1974) for the proposition that: 
Since the accuracy of a chemical test 
under Chapter 39-20 does not depend 
upon its being administered immediately 
after an arrest, accident or other 
-19-
eventf and thus a delay for a reasonable 
period of time while an arrested person 
considers or reconsiders a decision 
whether or not to submit to a chemical 
test will not frustrate the object of 
the Legislature in enacting Chapter 39-20." 
Though this statement by the court is accurate in part, 
it fails to take into consideration administrative efficiency. 
It can hardly be denied that in this age of rising crime rates, 
the effective use of our police force is of critical importance. 
It follows most logically that the use of our police 
force for the purpose of importuning recalcitrant arrestees for 
two hours or more at a time to simply perform the duties that 
they have previously consented to doing, is not efficient. If 
the statute and word "immediately11 is read literally, it still 
follows that officers will be required to give the arrestee an 
opportunity to take the test. If the arrestee is confused as to 
his rights, the officer is obligated to expound further. Such a 
procedure leaves no room for game playing and consequently will 
not allow for a waste of an officer's time. 
In shortf only a literal untechnical interpretation of 
U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2) will act to provide a fair and efficient 
means of dealing with drunk drivers. The only possible abuse of 
such a reading has been safeguarded against by the Utah Supreme 
Court requiring that after an arrestee has manifested confusion 
concerning his rights under the Implied Consent Lawf an officer 
has a duty to expound further. Such a reading of the statute not 
only provides justice to the arrestee but it also concomitantly 
addresses the critical concerns of administrative efficiency and 
judicial integrity in this area. After having had ones rights 
-20-
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Ch. 268 TRAFFIC RULES AND KLGULA'I IONS 
nny nnrrotir dnif or nny nthnr dnip tn n rlrpror ivhifh-rmt 1 trn him inuupublu 
nC nnfnlir Hwiin'np n iinlm'nln in Hwiun nit hn in nntnnl plnyninn] r 0 nfc r o ) Q f ^ 
imhinln im' th in th in n fn fn T t i n fnnt t h n f n n y pnnnnti nhn»pmH mjffr
 ft v iolat ion 
Iff t h J n nnhnnnt inn in np frpn hnnn nnt i t lnr l in ^nn nnnn dung ^ ^ P r f]K ) Q W Q UJ 
th?n n f ^ f n n n n 1 ] n n f »»«nf I ' fnfn n Hnfnnnn npninnt n n y nUnngn ^ f y jo lo t ing thJU 
oubooetion.] 
|C,,), Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be basal upon grams 
of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(d) Ever} person w ho is convicted of a violation of this section shall be 
punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than 6 
months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $299, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment; provided that in the event such person shall 
have inflicted a bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated said vehicle in a reckless or negligent manner or with a wanton or 
reckless disregard of human life or safety, he shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, and, in the 
discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000. 
(e) A peace officer may; without a warrant, arrest a person for a 
violation of this section when such violation is coupled with an accident or 
collision in which such person is involved and when such violation has in 
fact been committed, although not in his presence, when [4fce] a peace 
officer has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by 
such person. 
The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of any 
• '-on conv*V J - j* h> ^ecti >n. 
Action 41-K-44 10, ' tah Code Annotated 1953, as enac:ec :- Chapter 80, 
Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1959, as 
amended by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1967 as amend^ ^ ru—^:r 107, 
Laws of Utah 1969, is am.end.ed to read: 
41-6" i 1,10* Implied consent to chemical, breath, blood or urine tests for 
alcoholic content of blood at option of officer—Refusal to allow— 
Revocation of license—Court action on revocation—Person incapable 
of refusal—Results of test available—Who may give test—No right to 
have attorney present. 
(a) Any person operating a motor vehiek .-• • rns state shall be deemed 
to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, [«•] 
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining [the olooholie content of his 
blood] whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug, provided that such test is or tests are administered at 
the direction of a peace officer having [poaoonablc] grounds t* relieve such 
person to have been, driving [in an intoxicated conditio - ;n act.:a 
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physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug [The arrooting] A peace 
officer shall determine [within roaoon] which of the aforesaid tests shall be 
administered. 
No person, who has been requested pursuant to this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to 
select the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace 
officer to arrange for any specific test shall not be a defense to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in any criminal, civil or 
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the 
requested test or tests. 
[4ty—Any pcroon operating a motor vehicle in thio otatc ohall be 
determined to have given hio eonoont to a chemical tcot or tooto of hio blood 
or urine for the purpooo of determining whether ho wao driving or vvao in 
actual phyoioal control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of any 
nareotic drug or other drug if arrootod for any offenoe whore, at the time of 
arroot, tho arrooting officer hao roaoonablo groundo to bolicvo ouch pcroon 
to have boon driving or in actual phyoioal control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influoneo of a narcotic drug or other drug ] 
ffe)] (b) If such person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter 
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the 
chemical tests provided for in [oubooctiono] subsection (a) [or (b)] of this 
section and refuses to submit to such chemical test or tests, such person 
shall be warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal 
to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate 
a motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless such person immediately 
requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered, P&e] no test shall f-ftet] be given and [the arrooting] a peace 
officer shall [advioo tho poroon of hio righto undor thio oootion] submit a 
sworn report that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
drhing or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug and 
that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests as set forth 
in subsection (a) of this section. Within twenty days after receiving [«« 
affidavit] a sworn report from [tho orrooting] a peace officer to the effect 
that such person has refused a chemical test or tests the department shall 
notify such person of a hearing before the department. If at said hearing the 
department determines that the person was granted the right to submit to a 
chemical test or tests and [without roaoonablo cauoc] refused to submit to 
such test or tests, or if such person fails to appear before the department as 
required in the notice, the department shall revoke for one year his license 
or permit to drive. Any person whose license has been revoked by the 
department under the provisions of this section shall have the right to file a 
petition within thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the 
district court in the county in which such person shall reside. Such court is 
hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the matter for 
trial de novo upon ten days' written notice to the department and 
Ch. 268
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thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case and to 
determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the 
provisions of this act 
[444] ^cj Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition 
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or 
tests shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in 
[oubocetions] subsection (a) [or (b)] of this section, and the test or tests 
may be administered whether such person has been arrested or not. 
\^> i2L ! *! ' P^son v\ho was tested, the results of 
surh test or * : ]<.^u- * • 
[&] is! 0 ° ^ a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or [4aiy 
authorised laboratory technician] person authorized under section 26-15-4, 
acting at the request of a [poliec] peace officer can withdraw blood for the 
purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein. This 
limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Any 
physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or [duly authorised laboratory 
technician] person authorized under section 26-15-4 who, at the direction of a 
peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom [4he] a peace 
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or 
hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall be immune 
from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such test is 
;4 '1,v ' i" i^''r- ,J according to standard medical practice. 
••*-; J j The person to be tested [ohall be permitted to] ma>t at nis own 
expense, have a physician of his own choosing administer a chemical test in 
addition to the [eae] test or tests administered at the direction of [4be] a 
peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such additional test shall not 
affect admissability of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction 
of a peace officer, nor preclude nor delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent to the 
test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer, 
(g) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test 
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult an 
attorney nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, physician 
or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(h) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests 
under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible 
in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to 
have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
combination of alcohol and any drug. 
Section 5. Section amended. 
Section 58-12-30, 1 ?:u <;i •>.... utnl !!)!> ,- rnacu*; . Hnpter 167, 
Laws of I Itah 1969, is amended to read. 
